By Morton Keller

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States of Belonging

Getting at the Core

MAKING HARVARD MODERN

The Rise of America's University

UPDATED EDITION

MORTON AND PHYLLIS KELLER

Somebody needs to know everything
about each college and university,
but only about Harvard does everybody
need to know something.

—Clark Kerr

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To our
Harvard and Brandeis colleagues,
past and present

AFTERWORD

On an exquisitely beautiful Friday, October 12, 2001, forty-six-year-old Lawrence Summers became Harvard's twenty-seventh president. A welcoming article in the *Atlantic Monthly* called him "A Worldly Professor": a fit man to head a worldly university. His inauguration was bathed in the self-confidence one would expect from the premier university at the top of its game. Not Harvard, but the world it rather sententiously claimed to serve, seemed out of joint. The terrorist attacks of September 11 were only a month past, and on everyone's mind.

The new president took due note of Harvard's resplendent past. But he focused on its present strengths and future challenges. The Corporation urged him to make undergraduate education, science, and the new Allston campus across the Charles River his primary concerns. To these he added two themes that had been in the Harvard air for some time and echoed the more abstract rhetoric of the world of government from which he came. These were "community": "the need to come together as a university," and "globalization": Harvard's continuing on its progress from a national to an international institution.

But just as the national unity that followed 9/11 came to seem like an artifact of some remote, Arcadian time, so too did Summers's high hopes for his presidency erode under recurrent conflict with faculty and administrators. In February 2006 he announced his resignation, ending the shortest-lived Harvard presidency since the sudden death of Cornelius Felton in 1862.

The Summers Storm

Summers's departure came after a perfect storm of clashing personalities, differences over political and academic issues, and discontent with his

lack of consultation. It came down to a president schooled in the "intellectual imperialism" of Economics and the political culture of Washington confronting a faculty with little patience for either.

Summers first took on political correctness in the academy, a decision whose courage was less questionable than its prospects for success. He spoke up in support of ROTC, barred from the Harvard campus since the 1960s. Then came the news that Summers had taken iconic black University professor Cornel West to task for neglecting serious scholarship and giving too many As to his students. West responded with well-orchestrated outrage.

In the fall of 2002 Summers observed that anti-Israeli views had secured a foothold in "progressive communities." Referring to a petition, signed by some faculty members, that called on Harvard to divest its stock holdings in companies doing business with Israel, Summers warned that "serious and thoughtful people are advocating and taking actions that are anti-Semitic in their effect if not their intent." Although he asserted that "we should always respect the academic freedom of everyone to take any position," the *Harvard Crimson* and the *Boston Globe* strongly criticized him for stifling debate.

Summers's assault on political correctness came to a climax in January 2005, when he spoke at a National Bureau of Economic Research symposium on the problems of women in academic science. He had been assured that this was to be a private, no-holds-barred discussion. Summers included genetic factors among those that might explain the relative scarcity of women at the cutting edge of science. An MIT biologist in the audience famously declared that his comments made her physically ill. The press—and Summers's growing body of faculty critics—had a field day.

In what was by now a familiar pattern, Summers explained that all he wanted to do was stimulate discussion. He apologized for injured sensibilities and pledged to avoid future mishaps. His ROTC and Israel comments were minor provocations compared to the Cornel West and women-in-science incidents, and he put big money behind his penitence: large supplements to an Afro-American faculty already more than sufficient to its student market; some $50 million to further the advancement of women faculty at Harvard.

The gathering force of anti-Summers sentiment came to a head at FAS faculty meetings in February 2005. Political scientist Theda Skocpol spoke scathingly of "the pathologies of leadership that are undermining the honor, competitive effectiveness, and collegial governance of Harvard University." Leland Matory, a professor of African American Studies and

Anthropology, associated himself with Cornel West, women, and the Palestinians as a potential Summers target ("that could have been me") and offered a no-confidence motion. Skocpol proposed a more mollifying resolution that took exception to Summers's presidential style but commended him for his pledge(s) to act more collegially.

By a 218–185 vote, an unusually large turnout of faculty declared a "lack of confidence" in Summers's presidency. He promised to mend his ways, and the Corporation continued to back him. He brought in a new chief of staff (his third) and a personal press spokesman in the fall of 2005 and dropped his active role in curriculum reform.

But it did seem that character was destiny. Faculty discontent bubbled up again in early 2006: this time over matters that belonged not to the realm of political correctness but to issues of leadership, trust, and credibility. A group of Arts and Sciences department chairs, primarily from the Humanities and the Social Sciences, had begun to meet weekly in early 2005. They included some who wanted "to get Larry out, period," and some who were more concerned about governance, in particular the diminished capacity of the Dean to conduct the Faculty's business.

Criticism grew of the abrasive style with which Summers questioned the quality of proposed new appointees, of individual faculty members, and of whole departments in the humanities and the softer social sciences. His calls for a shift "from old disciplines to new" and "from old structures of governance to new" left many faculty members uneasy. And some scientists objected to what they saw as Summers's bias in favor of the more high profile life sciences.

Both Summers and Dean of Faculty William Kirby, whom he had appointed to replace chemist Jeremy Knowles, came to be widely regarded as less than effective leaders: the one for being more assertive than he should, the other for being less assertive than he should. Summers put pressure on Kirby to give up his office. But before Kirby could announce his resignation, word spread that he had been fired.

At a February 7, 2006, faculty meeting, the many strands of anti-Summers sentiment coalesced. Ill-feeling stirred by the manner of Kirby's removal was enhanced by concern over the supposed misdeeds of Economics professor Andrei Shleifer. A former student and close friend of Summers, Shleifer had led a U.S.-funded Harvard program that advised the post-Communist Russian government on privatizing state enterprises. In the course of his work he, an associate, and their wives invested in that country's developing bond market. A Federal court found Shleifer guilty of conspiracy and Harvard in breach of contract with the government. Shleifer paid $2 million and Harvard $26 million to settle the case. The

story, detailed in an article anonymously distributed to some faculty members before the February 7 meeting, led to questions from the floor as to what Summers knew, and when. He claimed to have no opinion or detailed knowledge on the matter, to the manifest disbelief of many of those present.

Fifteen faculty members (including five scientists) spoke against Summers; no one defended him. A few days later Anthropology professor Peter Ellison, who had resigned as Dean of the Graduate School because of unsatisfactory dealings with Summers, criticized him for his treatment of Kirby. He also accused Summers of being less than truthful when he denied that there had been discussions about extending the authority to grant Ph.Ds to non-FAS Schools.

Criticism by prominent faculty citizens, and the prospect of a more sharply worded no-confidence vote at the next FAS faculty meeting, convinced almost all members of the Corporation that the game was up. Summers announced his resignation on February 21, blaming "rifts between me and segments of the Arts and Sciences faculty" that irrevocably blocked his agenda for Harvard's renewal.

Much of the faculty saw this as a measure of its ability to rid itself of an offending president. Much of the outside world saw it differently. Boston city officials and business leaders, who liked Summers's plans for development of the Allston campus, were unhappy. So were some donors, who supported his vision for Harvard's future. There was considerable media tut-tutting over political correctness run wild, and over faculty grandees who "wanted no part of a president who actually dared to lead." A group of anti-Summers faculty, distressed over these reactions, asked acting president Derek Bok to issue a public statement detailing the reasons why Summers was removed. Bok, Brahmin in essence if not by birth, is said to have responded: "I won't do that, because it isn't done."

The Tong war between Summers and a portion of his faculty had two notable aspects: gloves-off acrimony, and extensive media attention. In (still-short) historical perspective, these appear to have been closely related to Harvard's place as the most notable of the great, worldly American universities.

The Summers storm resonated with the recent experience of a number of the nation's major institutions, their leaders, and their critics. It resembled not so much past Harvard imbroglios (Conant and some faculty in the late 1930s, Pusey and the University Hall bust in the late 1960s) as notable public flare-ups such as the Bork and Thomas Supreme Court appointment hearings, the Clinton impeachment, and the fervid politics of the Bush II years.

Over the course of the past half-century, there has been a growing tendency to subject leaders of the nation's major political, corporate, media, religious, and academic institutions to public laundering (and dirtying). This had its roots in the 1960s and the major alterations in public consciousness that then emerged. The mindset identified with the counterculture—many of whose advocates were in, and stayed in, the universities—left its mark on later generations' views of authority and leadership. And most conspicuously in the humanities and the softer social sciences, the belief took root that the highest academic calling was to craft language and fields of inquiry that would further a new academic culture, transcending the trammels of race, gender, class, institutions, and hierarchy.

A strikingly different world view flourished in other areas of the academy, most notably the natural sciences and Economics. Here the highest goals were to discover and apply the rules—the laws—that governed nature, human nature, and social behavior. Organization, expertise, and institutions were not objects of suspicion, but essential tools for getting on with the world's work.

Conflict between these perspectives fitfully lit up the Harvard sky in the course of the late twentieth century. Clashes rose over academic content (social *v.* biogenetic analysis in the social sciences, deconstruction/postmodernism *v.* traditionalism in literature and the arts, the Crits *v. omnes* in the Law School); over political correctness; over faculty and student gender and racial diversity; over the character of general education.

Summers's appointment bid fair to heighten these tensions. In intellect, temperament, talent, and experience he embodied the purposeful, take-charge style favored by the Corporation. And his agenda—to strengthen the sciences, instill more vitality into undergraduate teaching and the curriculum, develop the new Allston campus, foster more diverse political-intellectual discourse—had many supporters in the faculty, and among the students.

But a growing body of professors were alienated by Summers's ill-concealed contempt for the softer disciplines and his attacks on icons of political correctness. They came into unlikely alliance with faculty, administrators, and members of the Governing Boards who subscribed to an older, more genteel and circumscribed Harvard leadership style. One journalist colorfully if hyperbolically observed: "When Larry Summers got to Harvard he saw lazy, leftish professors inflating grades in what looked like an outdated Yugoslav workers' co-operative. The faculty saw a bumptious boor hijacking their university." It would have taken great subtlety and forbearance on Summers's part, and great indulgence in the

demands of leadership on the faculty's part, for relative tranquillity to have prevailed. Neither was in the cards.

Summers's departure was the most conspicuous Harvard event of the new century. But it is not clear that it would turn out to be the most significant one. Rather, what was happening, not happening, and likely to happen to teaching and scholarship, governance, the development of bioscience and the new Allston campus, and Harvard's ever-growing political and commercial worldliness, defined the university as it proceeded along its twenty-first-century way.

Undergraduate Life and Learning

There were aspects of undergraduate life other than the curriculum that exercised the faculty. Student culture remained deeply altered since the 1960s: barely regulated, the sexual revolution unabated, drinking on the rise. And grade inflation continued to be a fact of modern undergraduate life. As and Bs went from 52 percent of all grades in 1950 to more than 88 percent in 2004–2005. By 2000, 91 percent of Harvard's graduating students received honors degrees, compared to 51 percent at Yale and 44 percent at Princeton (whose students couldn't be *that* inferior). In 2005 the Faculty capped honors degrees at 50 percent of the total. It remained to be seen how long this exercise in quality control would withstand the demands of an ambitious, high-achieving student body.

When Summers talked about "globalization" as a major attribute of modern, worldly Harvard, he had in mind study abroad for all Harvard undergraduates. But most of them had no desire to spend term time overseas. Of the 792 students (out of a student body of about 6,500) who "pursued significant international experiences" in 2003–2004, a modest 166 were in course-credit programs. More than 400 "sought formal study, research, internship, or service opportunities during the summer." Another 200 or so "traveled 'with purpose'."

"Significant," it seemed, was a many-faceted word. But expanding student interest in the larger world was real enough. Summer internships and study programs, and Harvard-funded research abroad, substantially increased during the Summers years. By 2006, 1,100 students participated, 900 of them during the summer break.

Why did Summers and the Corporation think that large-scale curriculum reform was so important a priority when he came into office in 2001? One source: surveys of elite university students' satisfaction with their education persistently put Harvard at the low end of the scale.

Large courses, remote senior faculty, and a limited and rigidly applied Core curriculum fed discontent. And there was a widespread belief that Harvard had lacked a sense of purpose and direction in recent years and that the existing framework of disciplines, concentrations, and requirements was too confining at a time of rapidly changing intellectual constructs and student aspirations.

Summers gave some lip service to historian Bernard Bailyn's view that the chief need was to redirect Harvard students toward learning for its own sake. But this was submerged by the rule-the-world purposefulness of much of the student body and the faculty, as well as Summers's commitment to science and public service. He wanted a big increase in faculty-student contact through freshman and junior seminars; a fresh, hard look at the Core; an overhaul of the advising system; greater weight given to science and quantitative analysis. No fewer than seven committees reviewed the whole curricular ball of wax: general education, concentrations, science and technology, pedagogy, advising and counseling, writing and speaking, the calendar.

There were some tangible results. Almost all new students were accommodated in freshman seminars, in theory a big step forward in relieving the anomie of first-year undergraduate life. Significant numbers of full-time faculty, coming from both Arts and Sciences and the professional schools, were enlisted to teach the seminars. The advising system expanded, relying on non-faculty proctors and student peers rather than an overloaded and under-motivated regular faculty.

By common agreement, the 2004 report of the committee working on general education was a failure. Thomas Ehrlich of the Carnegie Corporation called its conclusions "pitiful." Beset by tensions between scientists and humanists, the committee threw up its hands and proposed to replace the Core with a distribution requirement, a something-for-everybody of three courses each from the natural sciences, the humanities, and the social sciences. That might have seemed innovative in 1900. But it struck most observers a century later as uninspired.

This was not the result of faculty indifference to undergraduate education, but of substantial disagreement over what its character should be. (Yale came up with a similarly unsatisfactory result in 2003 after a four-year curriculum review.)

In the fall of 2006 a committee of six senior faculty took another crack at the problem. Echoing Conant's 1945 General Education scheme, they sought "to connect what students learn at Harvard to life beyond Harvard, and to help them understand and appreciate the complexities of the world and their role in it." Instead of the Core's emphasis on disci-

plinary modes of understanding, they proposed broad topical themes: Aesthetic and Interpretive Understanding, Culture and Belief, Empirical and Ethical Reasoning, The Life and Physical Sciences, Societies of the World, The United States in the World. It remained to be seen how this latest squaring of the general education circle would ultimately fare. But it did reflect a large—perhaps the largest—intellectual development of early twenty-first-century Harvard: the growth of teaching and scholarship that cut across traditional disciplinary boundaries.

Of comparable potential significance was the January 2007 report of a Task Force on Teaching and Career Development, chaired by ubiquitous Dean of the Graduate School Theda Skocpol. It condemned the absence of incentives for good teaching in the Faculty of Arts and Sciences and called for mandatory course evaluations and greater weight to teaching in salary and tenure decisions. But again, it was unclear how this would sit with a faculty bred to and selected for its capacity for scholarship.

Governance

Modernizing Harvard's governance and instilling a greater sense of community were goals as attractive as improving undergraduate education. Attaining them proved to be no less difficult.

Summers did not question the growth of the central administration that began under Derek Bok in the early 1970s. The burgeoning bureaucracy by now was thoroughly professional; Old Harvard types staying on to serve Alma Mater were virtually gone. Officials with government or business backgrounds abounded. A new vice president regularly sent e-mails to an extended "special list," in which each recipient was assured in the best Harvard Business School managerial style, "I want you to be the first to know."

Under former National Institutes of Mental Health director and Harvard psychiatry professor Steven Hyman, the Office of the Provost became a more significant presence in Harvard affairs, interjected between those traditional players, the President and the Deans. It got a big boost from the substantial increase in endowment controlled by the Center, a product of Neil Rudenstine's fund-raising campaign in the 1990s. The Provost's Office swelled with vice and deputy provosts, including several professors: a new source of Center administrators. They had little or no line responsibility for academic functions, and no control over academic appointments or budgets. But as interdisciplinary and interfaculty centers and research initiatives grew, so did the potential of the Provost's Office to take a larger place in the University's academic life.

As in centuries past, the Corporation was in principle the ultimate governing body of the University. But the difficulty of knowing what was going on in so large and complex a place as Harvard substantially limited its role. The Corporation's small size and remoteness from the workings of the University made it a council of advisers more than a decision-making body. Its power to appoint (and to request the resignation of) the President, and its oversight of investments, were its most significant areas of authority.

In its makeup the Corporation of the early 2000s was a far cry from the past. As of 2006, none of its members except the President lived in the Boston–Cambridge area. That at least one Fellow have an academic background had become standard practice. In 2005 Hanna Gray, the tough-minded former president of the University of Chicago, retired to be replaced by former Duke president Nannerl Keohane, reputed to be as consultative as Gray was assertive. Attorney Conrad Harper joined the Corporation in 2000 as its first black member. He resigned five years later, in a letter to the Corporation protesting Summers's salary increase in the face of "patterns of faculty grievances." Harper's successor, black Georgetown Law professor Patricia King, and economist and Congressional Budget Office head Robert Reischauer, who joined in 2002, reduced the business-investment wing of the Corporation to James R. Houghton, Robert Rubin, and Treasurer James Rothenberg.

Washington and the academy had come to have a greater presence on Harvard's Board than Boston and the private sector. This was due in part to the University's ever-greater national character, and in part to the decline of Boston's Brahmins as movers and shakers. The degree to which this would alter the role of the Corporation in Harvard governance has yet to be seen. The same might be said of the alumni-elected Board of Overseers, changing in ways not dissimilar to the Corporation, and seeking as always to make its place in Harvard governance more substantial.

One thing remained as in the past: the looming presence of Harvard's endowment. When Summers left Harvard to go to Washington in 1991, it was a hearty $4.76 billion. When he returned as president a decade later, it was a stunning $15 billion. By 2007 it was closing in on a mind-boggling $30 billion, compared to competitor Yale's $18 billion.

Summers was prepared to raise and spend big money. Building expenditures averaged under $80 million a year in the late 1980s; they rose to $495 million a year in 2001–2005. Escalating investment returns induced the Corporation to temporarily raise endowment distribution from its customary 4-to-5 percent average to 8-to-9 percent. The additional income was to be used for student financial aid, faculty growth in the sciences, and the life sciences infrastructure planned for the new campus in Allston. The abrupt end of his term in office left Summers's initiatives up in the air. But there was little reason to think that they would be reversed, any more than that Harvard's capacity to raise large sums would be diminished.

The Faculty of Arts and Sciences

Now as before, the Faculty of Arts and Sciences was the most conspicuous and (at least in that Faculty's estimation) the most important jewel in the Harvard diadem. It had some 700 members in 2006, closing in on its goal of about 750. Harvard's 11–1 faculty-undergraduate and 5–1 faculty-graduate student ratios were not as favorable as those of its chief competitors, so a good case could be made for expansion. But relatively small departments given to rigorous selectivity made growth difficult. Another sticking point was the junior faculty's prospects for tenure. As in the past, the nagging fear that those up for promotion were not necessarily the best that ever were or would be worked against rapid growth.

Nor did the Faculty's resistance to the reality of its aging encourage turnover. In 1991 then-Dean Henry Rosovsky contemplated the imminent end of mandatory retirement. He predicted that the lures of estate-building, collegial companionship, scientists keeping their lab space, light teaching, and the fact that "the pace and productivity of self-generated work is not—to put it gently—closely supervised or regulated," made staying on as long as possible a rational choice.

Rosovsky linked this behavior to a decline in professorial civic virtue. He confessed himself unable to say what the standard teaching "load" amounted to. Unilateral reductions by individuals and departments, team-taught courses in which each faculty participant took full course credit, absence from Cambridge during term time: all of these transgressions went on without the Dean's authorization.

Rosovsky's prediction of delayed post-mandatory retirement turned

out to be all too accurate. A third of the scientists who had reached the age of seventy since 1994 had not yet retired by 2000–2001. By 2006 about a third more of the FAS faculty was over sixty than under fifty.

Almost 25 percent of the Faculty was female by 2006, 14 percent were minority: black, Hispanic, Asian. Given the relative newness of the drive to diversity, representation not surprisingly was lower in the tenured ranks: women 18.6 percent, minorities 9.3 percent. While the number of women in science tripled between 1991 and 2000, they still held only 6.8 percent of tenured science positions, compared to 21.9 percent in the humanities and 14.4 percent in the social sciences. Was this impressive, or disappointing, progress? Most vocal opinion said the latter.

Diversity was pursued with comparable vigor, and more statistical success, in the selection of undergraduates. The class that entered in the fall of 2006 was 52 percent female, 10 percent African American, 21 percent Asian American, 9.5 percent Latino, and 8 percent foreign.

But student economic and political diversity was less evident. In 2004 a Harvard Financial Aid Initiative exempted families with incomes under $40,000 from paying tuition. The exemption was later raised to $60,000, with lesser aid up to incomes of $80,000. The number of lower- and middle-income Harvard students rose, but its proportion remained small. About 75 percent of Harvard's undergraduates continued to come from the highest socioeconomic quartile, 16 percent from the bottom half. In this respect, at least, early twenty-first-century Harvard was not so different from early twentieth-century Harvard.

The announcement that Harvard would end its early admissions program in 2007 won much acclaim as another step in the University's long march toward a student body of greater economic diversity. Acting president Bok noted that early admissions programs "tend to advantage the advantaged," weighing against poorer, less sophisticated students unaware of the much higher likelihood that an early admissions applicant would be accepted.

Harvard's policy change came in the face of the general rush of colleges to an early admissions policy as a means of wooing and securing desirable applicants. But few schools chose to follow Harvard's lead. As in the case of Harvard's criticism of the merit scholarships that other schools adopted during the 1990s, its substantial lead in the admissions scramble hardly impeded its capacity to rise above crass self-interest. Besides, the new policy had a three-year cap. If it had untoward consequences, it could be dropped.

Science, the Professional Schools, and the New Campus

The most striking new development in Harvard's academic life was arguably in the realm of the life sciences. The social significance, and intellectual power and originality, of the field, and the money that it required, made bioscience the 800-pound gorilla of the twenty-first-century university.

There was some question as to how well Arts and Sciences was responding to this challenge. A February 2005 review of the past fifteen years found that while the FAS social science faculty had grown by 18 percent, and its humanities faculty by 11.2 percent, the natural sciences faculty expanded by only 7.7 percent. Why? One explanation was limited space, which long constrained Harvard's ability to be a major player in Big Science. Not coincidentally, Harvard's scientific tradition leaned more to the theoretical than to the applied.

An attention-getting July 2006 report by a University-wide Planning Committee for Science and Engineering focused on the new Allston campus as the potential meeting ground for scientists from Arts and Sciences, the Medical School, the School of Public Health, and the affiliated hospitals. In early 2007 a new University-wide standing committee on science and engineering was established, to act as midwife to "a new era of collaborative, cross-disciplinary science initiatives." A $50 million fund would get things started. And planning got under way for a new Department of Developmental and Regenerative Biology, run by the relevant Harvard Schools and the affiliated hospitals.

This agenda for new paths in science faculty-building was the most substantial challenge yet to the primacy of Harvard's existing departments and Schools. But it raised troubling questions. Who would pay for what promised to be a massively expensive effort? What, and who, would the appointees teach—if indeed they did any teaching? How (if at all) would they fit into the established structure of academic governance?

As of 2007, things were very much in flux. The Cambridge campus had seen a considerable expansion of the FAS science and engineering plant. But new battle lines emerged as big bioscience came to twenty-first-century Harvard. The traditional pecking order of scientific primacy—FAS first, the Medical School next, the Hospitals last—had been inverted: first by the Medical School outstripping FAS in some of the life sciences, and then by the Hospitals, flush with federal money, pulling ahead of HMS. Breaking with Harvard-centric tradition, Summers set out to help raise money to support genome research at the Broad Institute: M.I.T.-based, but in which the Harvard Medical School, the Hospitals, and FAS scientists collaborated.

A comparable dynamism was evident in Harvard's major professional schools. Large curricular reforms in Law, Business, and Medicine stood in dramatic contrast to the uncertainty attending the future of general education in Harvard College. They had strikingly common concerns, reflecting the changing character of their professions.

The destructive ideological divisions at the Law School were all but gone in the new century, under the ameliorating deanships of Robert Clark and Elena Kagan. The Law and Economics school of legal analysis, the intellectual and ideological antithesis of the Critical Legal Studies movement of the 1960s and 1970s, became more prominent. And a new generation of younger faculty, without a strong commitment to either of those schools of legal thought, adopted a pragmatic approach to the law as a tool for getting things done. The Law faculty voted unanimously in 2006 to add required first-year courses in non-judicial lawmaking (legislation and administrative law), international and comparative law, and a more holistic approach to the solving of clients' problems.

The Business School added two courses to its first-year core in 2000. One was in entrepreneurship. Most HBS students wanted not to join large corporations but to start their own firms. The other dealt with leadership and corporate accountability: the existing concern for business ethics raised to a higher pedagogical power.

With a student body more than a third "international" (defined as having a non–United States passport), and business at the core of globalization, HBS had to cast itself in a new light. Thirty percent of its trademark case studies came to be based on international enterprises, and the School set up five research centers worldwide. Its major problem appeared now to be not the traditional one of its place in the Harvard professional school pecking order, but how to find faculty willing to give up the greater pecuniary rewards of the business world. One response: bring in Ph.Ds (by 2006 only half of the faculty had a business school background) and instruct them in the mysteries of HBS pedagogy.

Like Business and Law, Medicine changed its general curricular approach in the early 2000s. It sought to adapt its instruction to the revolution in molecular medicine, add more small-group instruction, and integrate the care of patients more closely with the medical science curriculum. Like its fellow Schools, HMS put additional emphasis on the social dimension of its profession: health policy, medical ethics. And an Academic Center for Teaching and Learning, in which at least some

of the HMS faculty of over 9,000 might be helped to become more effective teachers, came into being in 2006.

Under Joseph Martin, who served as Dean for a decade from 1997, the Medical School adapted to the powerful surge of genetic and biomedical research. The political appeal, cost, and need for clinical trials in this work led government and other funding agencies to favor researchers at the Harvard-affiliated hospitals over those based in the Medical School. In response Martin brought together some 800 Boston area oncologists to form the nation's largest cancer research center at the Dana-Farber Cancer Institute. Its success in attracting major government grants made it a model for other efforts in the collaborative study of disease.

The growth of Centers and joint degree programs, products of the brave new academic world of inter-disciplinary approaches and subjects, reinforced the sense that new academic currents were eroding the primacy of the traditional Arts and Sciences disciplines. By 2003 Harvard had more than a dozen "multifaculty" degree programs, and twice as many interfaculty "initiatives." Research centers, programs, projects, and institutes spread like kudzu grass. There were more than fifty of them in the Kennedy School, some thirty in the Ed School, numerous others in FAS, Law, Medicine, and Public Health. Every bottom now had a tub, observed one wag. But many of these enterprises, particularly in the Kennedy School, were lightly funded.

Centers and institutes could respond quickly to new areas of research, and they fostered collaboration across disciplinary or School lines. But they came at a cost. It was not always clear to whom they reported, and often they lured professors from teaching and other departmental responsibilities. Dean Jeremy Knowles set up five-year reviews of the FAS Centers' funding and called on them to demonstrate their value as teaching and not just research bodies.

The most conspicuous setting for the forces defining twenty-first century Harvard was the new campus across the Charles River in Allston. Larger than the Cambridge campus, it could not be developed all at once: much of it was tied up in long-term leases and permanent easements. But that hardly removed the need for large-scale planning. An official called the development of the Allston campus a "city building" project, replete with issues of transportation, land use, and design, requiring the expenditure of billions of dollars and decades of time.

A University Physical Planning Committee wrestled with varying visions: A science park embracing scientists from Arts and Sciences, the

Medical and Public Health Schools, the Harvard-affiliated hospitals, and even outlier MIT? Or a new academic campus replicating the old one in Cambridge, with a mix of undergraduate and graduate education, museums and housing, and science research centers?

By 2007 the agreed-upon model was a mixed-use campus. Several new undergraduate Houses might eventually rise on the Allston side of the Charles (though whether or not this meant a larger student body was unclear). The Schools of Public Health and Education were likely to move there; the Law School was equally unlikely to do so.

Unsurprisingly, concrete (in both senses of the word) progress came first in the realm of the life sciences. Planning for a half-million-square-foot building to house in part a new Harvard Stem Cell Institute got under way in 2006, with another unit of equal size to follow. Construction and fundraising proceeded slowly. But the impetus behind big bioscience in Allston appeared to be unstoppable.

Looking Ahead

Is Harvard, as one journalist put it, an institution "that needs serious renovation"? Certainly not if money, prestige, and the quality of its students and faculty are the measures. Harvard's chief problem is to adapt its extraordinary assets to the demands of a fast-changing academic environment.

The financial and organizational needs of the life sciences and the new Allston campus are likely to be the most prominent items on that agenda. That may well lead to alternatives to the traditional Harvard framework of departments encased within either the Faculty of Arts and Sciences or the professional schools.

It remains necessary to cultivate a student body attracted not only by the status that Harvard confers but by its vast intellectual resources. Yet other, competing claims—of "legacies" (faculty, alumni, and donors' children), diversity (of race, gender, income), character and talent—assure an ongoing tension between conflicting student recruitment purposes.

The worldly university's desire for a public leadership role has to come to terms with the constraints imposed by political correctness in the faculty culture. And an autonomous faculty can drift into a self-sufficiency which negates the ideal of Harvard as a community of scholars.

The University's evergreen desire for more money and prestige makes for incessant fund-raising. This can have consequences ranging from

admitting the marginally competitive children of big donors to research grants with questionable strings attached.

Finally, the size and complexity of governance feeds the growth of central administration inclined to make policy from the top down instead of fostering change from the bottom up.

To general acclaim, Derek Bok, who more than three decades before had quieted an institution in turmoil from the conflict of the late 1960s, answered "a second call to calm troubled waters" by becoming acting president for the 2006–2007 academic year. The most pressing issue of the moment was the selection of Harvard's next president.

In February 2007 the choice was made: fifty-nine-year-old Drew Gilpin Faust, a historian of the American South who since 2001 had been the notably successful Dean of the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study. In the by-now established Harvard presidential sequence (Conant-Pusey, Pusey-Bok, Bok-Rudenstine, Rudenstine-Summers), she was most conspicuous for her contrast with her predecessor. Hers was a purely academic career: in this she was to Summers what Pusey had been to Conant. Her academic roots were planted as deeply in the pliant soil of the humanities as Summers's were in the harsher terrain of Economics. In her leadership style she promised to be as conciliatory and consensual as Summers (and Conant) were edgy and contentious. She was also, of course, Harvard's first woman president, and the first without a Harvard degree. But Pusey the first small-college president, Bok the first non-Harvard College graduate, and Summers the first Jewish president also broke new ground.

Faust faced essentially the same cluster of issues—the issues of the worldly university—that confronted her predecessors. For the foreseeable future, as in the recent past, the need remained for a leader with the vision, skills, and toughness necessary to handle the demands of rapid intellectual change, big science, a new campus, a knows-its-own-mind faculty: of a Harvard ever larger, ever more intricate.