**Hildreth, Mirza, Bhutto: Reflections on Pakistan’s 1950s Politics**

Historians have used U.S. State department records to shed light on such issues as the early Pakistan state’s refugee crisis, the re-emergence of ethnic tensions following the short lived unity of the closing period of the freedom movement, and the emergence of a ‘political economy of defence’ rather than one of development.[[1]](#footnote-1) Lying behind these concerns is the overarching theme of the failure to consolidate democracy in the state’s formative years. Scholars have increasingly argued that the failure to develop strong political institutions, hindered democratic consolidation. It is linked with the weak institutionalisation of the Muslim League in the future Pakistan areas, where British rule had consolidated the power of local elites. The freedom movement had little choice but to co-opt them as work by myself, David Gilmartin, Sarah Ansari and others has revealed.[[2]](#footnote-2) Patron-client politics never really went away and resurfaced immediately after Pakistan was achieved. Whilst the post-independence provincial politics were especially marked by factionalism, this was inducted into national level politics where the Muslim League leadership had recourse to local leaders in the absence of its own strong powerbase and local constituencies of support. The fragmentation of the Muslim League from the mid-1950s accelerated this process.

U.S. official records at College Park, Maryland, have been supplemented by private papers at the Library of Congress and in the various Presidential Libraries. Whilst there are plans to digitise the Horace Hildreth Collection, researchers presently need to consult it at the Maine Historical Society. While Portland is hardly off the beaten track, it is just over 2 hours by coach on I-95N from Boston, the Collection’s location and the problems of accessing online catalogue material have discouraged its use. An archivist informed me last November that no one had utilized the material in the Hildreth Papers relating to Pakistan. This is surprising given that Hildreth was the Ambassador to Pakistan in the crucial period from May 1953-May 1957. During this time Pakistan both entered into Cold War pacts with Washington and began the drift to authoritarianism, which has been termed a ‘creeping coup.’

I was happy to take my place in the small reading room just off Portland’s main street. On one occasion, the atmosphere was enlivened by a group of researchers arriving in period costume. My primary interest was to search for correspondence that illustrated the close working relationship between the U.S. Embassy and the British Diplomatic Mission in Karachi. This theme is part of my wider study of the history of the U.K. High Commission in Pakistan. The following letter however alerted me to the possibility that the Hildreth papers might possess other interest for scholars.

Early in April 1957, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto sent a hand-written letter from his Larkana estate to Horace Hildreth. This was only a matter of weeks before Hildreth would return to the United States. Bhutto fulsomely declared that the former Governor of Maine’s departure would ‘leave a particular void for me and my family. I have superlatives, but I cannot refrain from saying that you were the finest ambassador we have had and are likely to have for many, many years to come.’[[3]](#footnote-3) Hildreth termed it an ‘overly complimentary letter’, when he sent Bhutto the autographed picture which his correspondent had also requested.[[4]](#footnote-4)

The exchange prompts a number of questions. What was so special about Hildreth’s tenure as Ambassador? Why should Bhutto feel personally indebted to him? What had brought the young lawyer and the American diplomat together in the first place? There is certainly no reference to their relationship in Stanley Wolpert’s standard biography of Bhutto. The Hildreth correspondence in fact questions Wolpert’s narrative that Bhutto owed his political emergence primarily to his connection to the powerful Iskander Mirza who became Governor-General in October 1955. Wolpert had revealed that Mirza was a close family friend of Bhutto’s father Sir Shah Nawaz.[[5]](#footnote-5) Private letters in the Hildreth collection tell a somewhat different story that Bhutto requested the American Ambassador to bring him to Mirza’s attention. We will examine these circumstances later, before moving on to consider briefly what further insights emerge from the Hildreth correspondence concerning America’s mid-1950s response to Pakistan’s increasing political chaos and the drift to authoritarianism. It is first necessary, however, to explain how Hildreth had become the head of the increasingly influential diplomatic mission in Karachi.

Hildreth was Washington’s fifth Ambassador to Pakistan. Two of his predecessors (H. Merle Cochran and John Cabot) had never proceeded to the country following their appointment. Paul Alling the first ambassador became seriously ill and had to terminate his mission after 4 months in post. He died at the Naval Medical Center Bethesda after his return home. These circumstances led to a series of interim appointees including the colourful and eccentric Lahore Consul-General Hooker Doolittle. Hildreth thus hardly had a hard act to follow.

There had been more than bad luck behind the ad hoc nature of the leadership of the Embassy. Pakistan was not a priority for Washington in its early years of independence. America was more concerned with the threat of Communism to war-torn Europe and to China. Within South Asia, more attention was devoted to India because of its greater trade potential.[[6]](#footnote-6) Washington was content to follow the British diplomatic lead and drew heavily on the briefings that London provided especially as the Kashmir crisis erupted in October 1947. It was however the British failure to resolve the conflict between its two dominions that initially raised the Subcontinent’s profile among U.S. policy makers with the C.I.A taking the lead. Pakistan’s proximity to the Soviet Union increased its strategic interest as the Cold War intensified. America established listening posts in Pakistan. Later in 1958, the Eisenhower administration acquired an airbase facility at Badaber which was used to launch U-2 spy plane missions over Soviet Central Asia. In the pre-Satellite observation era, the facility formed an immensely important C.I.A Cold War asset.

Hildreth’s appointment thus occurred to the backdrop of growing U.S. interest in Pakistan. He was the first political appointee as Ambassador, all his predecessors had been Foreign Service Career Officers. Hildreth owed his posting to his friendship with Milton Eisenhower, the brother of the war hero and Republican leader Dwight who had entered the White House in January 1953. Ike as he was affectionately known had been the former Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces in Europe. While military assistance between Pakistan and the U.S. had been agreed before he took his seat in the Oval Office, the ties between the two countries intensified and was driven by the roles in his administration played by John Foster Dulles at State and his younger brother Allen at the C.I.A.

Hildreth, entered politics a decade after he had graduated from Harvard with a law degree in 1928. He was elected by a landslide margin as Governor of Maine in 1944. Just four years later, however, he lost the Republican nomination to Margaret Chase Smith. She was later to embark on a career as the longest serving Republican female member of the Senate. In 1948, Hildreth, rebuffed by his native Maine Republicans, turned his interest to educational administration and the pioneering of television in the state. The latter concern continued throughout his tenure as Ambassador. He kept up a lengthy correspondence from Karachi with his brother Charles on his broadcasting company.[[7]](#footnote-7) Hildreth became friendly with the influential Milton Eisenhower during the time they served as Presidents of Universities in Pennsylvania. Hildreth was President of Bucknell University, a private liberal arts college in Lewisburg. Eisenhower was President of Pennsylvania State University. A year into his tenure, Horace was still in correspondence thanking Milton for his support in securing the Ambassadorship.[[8]](#footnote-8)

By 1954, Pakistan and the United States had signed the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement. Pakistan then joined the Baghad Pact (later CENTO) and SEATO. Military hardware became available for the Military Assistance Pakistan (MAP) army formations. Dollars also poured into Pakistani agriculture. Within a year of Hildreth’s appointment the annual U.S. budget in this sector of the economy was running at 23 million dollars.[[9]](#footnote-9) Scholars have been more critical regarding military expenditures, as it is argued, that their strengthening of the military institutions created the conditions for a ‘creeping coup’ as power slipped from elected politicians to the military and the bureaucratic elites. Hildreth’s tenure coincided with the growing authoritarian tendencies. His private correspondence reveals that he shared Mirza’s attitudes regarding the failing political class. Yunas Samad has in fact maintained, that American support was ‘crucial’ when the Governor-General Ghulam Muhamad dissolved the Constituent Assembly on 24 October 1954 [[10]](#footnote-10). At this stage, Mirza, was the Defence Secretary and General Ayub Khan, the Commander-in-Chief. The triumvirate were keen advocates of a stable political order committed to the U.S. alliance. When the President of the Constituent Assembly mounted a legal challenge to the dissolution, Ghulam Muhammad turned to the English Constitutional scholar, Sir Ivor Jennings for advice.[[11]](#footnote-11)

Historians are generally in agreement that the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly marked an important landmark in Pakistan’s drift to authoritarian rule. Ayesha Jalal has provided the most sustained analysis of the circumstances surrounding the rise of military rule. She points to the boost which the army and bureaucracy received from US support.[[12]](#footnote-12) This provided the unelected pillars of the state with resources to strengthen their development. Simultaneously, a motive and justification for political intervention was provided in the need to secure the Cold War alliance from political opposition. Many Bengali politicians criticised this alignment, although they were not alone in this. Jalal’s reading of the 1958 coup is that it was designed to ‘pre-empt’ a future Bengali dominated National Assembly’s reversal of Pakistan’s pro-western foreign policy.

In sum, by the time that Bhutto was contemplating abandoning a legal career for politics, firstly, Pakistan was linked with the U.S. Cold War alliance system; secondly, civilian channels were increasingly bypassed as the bureaucratic-military elite guided Pakistan’s development with an eye on the U.S. alliance. Wolpert argues that Bhutto chose not to enter the party politic fray in 1954 because his father’s leading landlord rival, Mohammad Khuhro was chief minister of Sind.[[13]](#footnote-13) It may also be that he saw a fractured political system as not the most effective avenue of advancement. Appointment could prove a more reliable method for entry to government than elections and party loyalty. This approach created the circumstances for an emerging relationship between Mirza, Bhutto and Hildreth. It meant, however, that Bhutto had to tone down his hostility to the One Unit scheme, as Mirza strongly backed it..[[14]](#footnote-14) Indeed, the Governor-General had lifted Khuhro’s political disqualification and invited him to form a new government precisely because he supported West Pakistan’s political unification.[[15]](#footnote-15) Wolpert provides glimpses into the ways in which Mirza advanced Bhutto’s career, but he excludes the Hildreth connection. We must turn to the Ambassador’s private correspondence to possess a more rounded understanding of how Bhutto became, ‘an apprentice to power.’

The letters which passed between Bhutto and Hildreth sit awkwardly with the Wolpert narrative that Mirza was an established family friend who thus provided Bhutto with access to power. Wolpert is equally silent about any Iranian connection which might have brought Mirza and Bhutto together. Mirza possessed Persian ancestry. His second wife from October 1954, the Iranian Naheed Amirteymour became a close friend of Nusrat Bhutto.[[16]](#footnote-16) We will approach the exchange of letters between Hildreth and Bhutto between 1955-7 with two initial questions in view. Why did Bhutto see Hildreth as a conduit to Mirza? How had the relationship between Bhutto and Hildreth began?

Their correspondence reveals that Bhutto had first come to the ambassador’s notice because of the legal advice he provided regarding the tax liabilities of Hildreth’s daughter Dodie following her marriage in Karachi to Humayn Mirza. Humayn was the eldest son of Iskander Mirza and his first wife Rifaat Begum. Horace Hildreth had turned to Bhutto not only because he recognised him as an able and up and coming lawyer, but because he saw him as pro-western in outlook. The Ambassador deemed Bhutto ,‘one of the able and promising young men in Pakistan…(who) is friendly to the U.S.’[[17]](#footnote-17) He therefore naturally recommended the young Karachi High Court lawyer to his American Attorney for assistance in an investigation regarding Dodie’s tax situation.[[18]](#footnote-18) Horace was concerned about Dodie’s personal family trust funds. He invited Bhutto to his Karachi Residence early in January 1955 to broach him regarding legal advice.[[19]](#footnote-19) Within a few weeks, Bhutto had come up with detailed responses to Hildreth’s questions.’[[20]](#footnote-20)

Bhutto’s eager assistance came at a time when Iskander Mirza’s political stock was rapidly rising. Shortly after Dodie’s marriage to Humayn, Iskander Mirza was sworn in as acting Governor General. He stepped into this role because of Ghulam Muhammad’s increasing illness. Dodie was the only woman to attend the inauguration. Her father in law now became in Horace Hildreth’s colourful language ‘the big boss’ of Pakistan. It was this close family connection that led some commentators to term Hildreth himself as ‘the Prime Minister of Pakistan.’ Following Mirza’s election as Pakistan’s first President, on 7 March 1956, Bhutto immediately sent a congratulatory letter to Horace Hildreth. ‘He is a close relative of yours and you must naturally be elated by his success…I reiterate that….Major-General Iskander Mirza is the tallest among our politicians and his election at this critical juncture will unleash imperishable benefits to this young and growing country.’[[21]](#footnote-21) Bhutto opportunistically dropped Mirza after Ayub Khan had rapidly tired of playing second fiddle to him following the October 1958 coup. Years later, Bhutto was to characterize Mirza as ‘a gentleman who knew nothing about politics. He thought that by small gestures, pranks and tricks he could run the ship of State.’[[22]](#footnote-22)

Historians have trenchantly criticised Mirza for his anti-democratic sentiments. [[23]](#footnote-23) He maintained Ghulam Muhammad’s approach to the office of Governor-General making it a powerful executive authority, rather than a ceremonial role. It was therefore unsurprising that he sought a Presidential system of Government in the 1956 Constitution which was to survive for just over 30 months. Mirza dismissed no less than four prime ministers in the space of two years. One of these, the former Bombay businessman I.I. Chundrigar survived scarcely two months. Mirza’s vision of a top-down centralised state was reflected in his support for the One Unit Scheme. This merged the Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan and the Frontier in the West Pakistan province. The western wing of the country could subsequently counterbalance the renamed East Pakistan wing. Mirza’s authoritarian tendencies have been traced to his time as a political agent in the tribal belt during British colonial rule. [[24]](#footnote-24) Political Agents maintained order in these areas, through the carrot of cash subsidies and the stick of punitive expeditions and collective fines. Customary law enforced through tribal *jirgas* was the order of the day.

Mirza was not however alone in undermining Pakistan’s fragile democracy.[[25]](#footnote-25) M.M. Syed argues that Pakistan’s democratic failure owed much to the ‘misfortune’ of having such seasoned bureaucrats as Chaudhri Muhammad Ali and Ghulam Muhammad elevated to positions of authority.[[26]](#footnote-26) Moreover, Mirza’s reputation was deliberately blackened by his 1958 co-coup leader Ayub Khan in the autobiography, *Friends not Masters*. Ayub destroyed Mirza’s papers and diaries which explains the absence of a serious study of his career. The reality of Pakistan’s democratic demise can no more be solely attributed to Mirza, than to the distorting influence that the state’s alliance with the U.S. exerted.

We need to go back in time a little to see how Hildreth’s relationship with Mirza opened doors for Bhutto. The professional legal connection became transformed into a social one that centred around the Hildreth family’s love of hunting that they had brought to Pakistan from their native Maine. Sindh was noted as a duck-hunter’s paradise, with Larkana’s paddy fields famous for their large mallard population.[[27]](#footnote-27) Hunting in Sindh was of course accompanied by lavish hospitality. The *nashta* (breakfast meal) that proceeded the shooting frequently ran to 25 courses in the style of royal banquets.[[28]](#footnote-28) Wolpert refers to Bhutto providing hospitality to Generals Ayub and Mirza after they had shot game on the Bhutto family estate at Larkana in the winter of 1955-6.[[29]](#footnote-29) According to the memoirs of Pir Ali Muhammad Rashdi, who was a renowned hunter, Mirza was a ‘most likeable person as a sportsman. He followed the rules of the game, and unlike many other highly placed officials, never took advantage of his position in the field of sport…. He was a reasonably good duck and partridge shot.’[[30]](#footnote-30)

There is no reference in Wolpert’s account however to the Hildreths’ presence at Larkana. The Hildreth correspondence reveals, however, that Bhutto followed up his legal work for Hildreth with invitations to shoots at his Larkana estate. Katharine accompanied Horace as she fancied herself as a good shot and indeed letters home to Maine revealed that at Larkana and elsewhere she often bagged as many quail, partridges, bustards and deer as did her husband.[[31]](#footnote-31) Horace acknowledged Katharine’s marksmanship in a letter to his brother Charles. During a five days hunting trip to Bahawalpur where they were shooting deer, he referred to the fact that they had brought down a deer from a moving car, ‘Since we were both firing at it, it is impossible to tell who hit it.’[[32]](#footnote-32)

It is clear that in both February 1956 and 1957, the Hildreths shot partridge and deer on the Larkana estate.[[33]](#footnote-33) Most importantly, private correspondence reveals that following the hospitality, Horace assured his host that he had brought up Bhutto’s name in conversations with Iskander Mirza.[[34]](#footnote-34) Early in May 1956, Bhutto thanked him declaring that, ‘I had a very encouraging interview with the President. He asked me to send him my academic CV. You have indeed been most kind and considerate for speaking to the President and the Prime Minister on my behalf.[[35]](#footnote-35) The CV which is available in the Hildreth papers refers to Bhutto’s employment as a part-time assistant lecturer in law at the University of Southampton. Bhutto had secured this appointment through the support of his father’s friend at Christ Church College, Professor S.N. Grant-Bailey. Bhutto was in fact to return to Karachi by P & O liner in November 1953 without having delivered a lecture. It explains the lack of reference to his ‘career’ at Southampton in the University’s Special Collections.

Even before his hunting expeditions, Hildreth had informed Bhutto in May 1955 that, ‘I have already (recommended you) on more than one occasion and hope that my recommendations in the course of time may prove interesting and profitable for you.’[[36]](#footnote-36) Mirza was to offer Bhutto the post of Mayor of Karachi which he turned down. Hildreth reassured him early in January 1957 that the President, ‘is well aware of you which is something for any young man to have from the President of the country.’[[37]](#footnote-37) Eight months later, Bhutto accepted the offer to join the Pakistan delegation to the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea. He was beginning to gain prominence in public life.

Hildreth, Mirza and Ayub all recognised that Bhutto was a rising star. For Hildreth, his value also stemmed from a perceived pro-American outlook. Mirza and later Ayub saw him as a clever political operator who could forward national interests. There was also the bonus that he was a Sindhi and therefore might potentially strengthen national cohesion. Hildreth also possessed a personal as well as professional motivation, in cultivating ties. Bhutto might prove useful for his son-in-law. Certainly, Hildreth went out of his way to ensure that Dodie and Humayn joined one of Bhutto’s Larkana shooting parties, noting in a letter to Bhutto in mid-January 1956 that, ‘I should like you and Humayn to become acquainted.’[[38]](#footnote-38) Within a couple of weeks, Horace Hildreth was regaling family members in Maine of his son-in-law accompanying him to Larkana where they were the ‘guests of a very attractive young man here who has the unusual background of being a graduate for both Oxford and the University of California.’[[39]](#footnote-39)

While Bhutto was seeking to make his way in Pakistan’s politics, through coming to the notice of the increasingly powerful bureaucratic elite, Humayn’s horizons, however, stretched to Harvard. He was studying at Harvard for an MBA when his father embarked on the October 1958 coup that was to rapidly bring about his own downfall. Humayn and Dodie had settled in New England earlier in January 1957. President Mirza was ‘pleased and interested’ by Hildreth’s immediate offer to him to speak with them on the phone line from the U.S. Embassy.[[40]](#footnote-40)

Hildreth in the best traditions of a diplomatic head of mission, reached out to a range of key players in Pakistan’s politics. It is important to realize that Bhutto and Mirza were not his only connections. He took soundings, arranged formal meetings and lavishly entertained. Even with respect to hunting, Larkana was not his only destination, or Bhutto his only shooting partner. Hildreth regularly hunted with Pir Pagaro, Pir Shah Mardan Shah II. The Pir’s backing for Khuhro made him a rival of Bhutto.[[41]](#footnote-41) The Hildreths signed up for hunting expeditions with the Pir Pagaro at the Thanksgiving Week and Christmas week in 1954.[[42]](#footnote-42) There was an element of mixing business with pleasure as following the young Pir’s emergence into political life, the U.S. embassy regarded him as a key informant because of his connections and large numbers of disciples.[[43]](#footnote-43) Earlier in November 1954, Hildreth accompanied the pro-American Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra on a duck shoot in Bahawalpur. Mirza and Wajid Ali, the brother of Syed Amjad Ali, then Pakistan Ambassador in Washington later joined the party.[[44]](#footnote-44) Syed Amjad Ali and his wife had been guests earlier that summer at the Hildreth holiday home at Saturday Cove on the Maine Coast.[[45]](#footnote-45)

The long- awaited Pakistan Constitution did not usher in hoped for political stability. To the contrary during Hildreth’s last year as Ambassador, Pakistan experienced mounting political chaos. Hildreth like his British counterpart Sir Alexander Symon, who was High Commissioner from 1954-61, became increasingly concerned. Instability threatened the state’s ability to act as a reliable Cold War ally in the regions of South and West Asia. Hildreth’s and Symon’s political reporting became increasingly important as Pakistan’s democratic crisis deepened from 1957 onwards. Prime Ministers came and went with alarming rapidity. Tensions between the two wings of the country threatened a wider crisis. Their despatches drew on press accounts, and soundings made by themselves and other diplomatic staff. Political conversations inevitably privileged the views of an admittedly influential, but narrow strata, of Pakistan society. President Mirza undoubtedly encouraged a reading of political corruption that required addressing. As early as 1956 he was telling Hildreth of the need for dictatorship in Pakistan. He also took British diplomats into his confidence. In late December 1957, he showed Symon a copy of the notes of a typically fractious Cabinet meeting. ‘I then asked whether I could have a copy’, Symon reported to London, ‘and rather to my astonishment he said, “Yes take a copy and send it to Mr Macmillan.’”[[46]](#footnote-46)

While both Hildreth and Symon sympathised with many of Mirza’s criticisms regarding the failure of Pakistani democracy, one cannot jump from this to say that policy makers in Washington and London actively encouraged military intervention. The State Department in fact presciently warned that military rule would further weaken the fragile relationship between East and West Pakistan.[[47]](#footnote-47)

If Washington interfered at all in the weeks leading up to the coup, it was to unsuccessfully try to mend the breach between Mirza and the former Prime Minister Suhrawardy.[[48]](#footnote-48) British diplomats shared the American view that Mirza and Suhrawardy acting in concert, ‘would be best for Pakistan.’[[49]](#footnote-49) Hildreth by this time had departed the scene, but Symon was still in post. Suhrawardy unlike many politicians possessed support in both East and West Pakistan. Mirza however had no real intention of restoring the veteran Bengali to power having manoeuvred him out of office as recently as October 1957. He saw any future coalition government as a threat to his pet One Unit scheme project. Mirza was in any case on edge as Pakistan’s first national elections, scheduled for 1959, might undermine his power as President. The newly returned National and Provincial Assemblies would form the Electoral College for his Presidential re-election.

Both Washington and London were bystanders in the unfolding drama. Mirza was careful however to keep both in the loop, so shortly before the coup of 7 October he informed the American Ambassador James Langley of the impending intervention. Hildreth some 18 months earlier averred that he would not be surprised if democracy fall ‘flat on its face’ in Pakistan, ‘at any time within the next fifteen years.’[[50]](#footnote-50) The day after the coup, Ayub Khan delivered a withering attack on the politicians, claiming that they had waged, ‘a ceaseless and bitter war against each other regardless of the ill-effects on the country, just to whet their appetites and satisfy their base demands.’ There had been no limit, ‘to the depth of their baseness, chicanery, deceit and degradation.’[[51]](#footnote-51) Tensions soon developed between Mirza and Ayub. President Mirza survived a mere 20 days, as the army chief was not prepared to take a junior role in the new authoritarian setup. Mirza was given an hour to pack before beginning an impecunious exile in London. Shortly before his dismissal, he had formed a 12 man cabinet. The youthful Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto continued his ascent to power in the role of Commerce Minister. The hunting trips with Hildreth had indeed proved profitable for him.

If London and Washington did not precipitate the coup, both unquestioningly accepted its justification. Symon gave the Ayub regime a clean bill of health throughout the remainder of his time in Pakistan In December 1959, President Eisenhower’s visit was a public American endorsement. The American administration reconciled support for Ayub with its ‘proclaimed devotion to democracy’, by declaring that military rule was a ‘temporary bridge’ on the road to consolidated democratic government.[[52]](#footnote-52) British approval took the form of a 15days Royal Visit in February 1961. It marked the high point of Symon’s time in Pakistan. The Queen’s speech, carefully crafted by officials, in response to Field Marshall Ayub Khan’s welcome address, remarked that it was not surprising if British political forms were found, ‘to need modification to meet circumstances far different. ‘The forms are not sacred’, the young Elizabeth intoned, ‘the ideals behind them are.’[[53]](#footnote-53)

In conclusion, the relationships between Hildreth, Bhutto and Mirza remain a fascinating and under-researched aspect of Pakistan’s history in the 1950s. Bhutto’s wealth, cleverness and landed power destined him for a glittering political career. Local Sindhi politics and the realisation that power was shifting from the political to the military-bureaucratic elites led him to enter public life through appointment rather than election. The Hildreth correspondence reveals that this route was not as straightforward as simply seeking preferment on the basis that Mirza was an old family friend. Similarly, the Hildreth-Mirza relationship was more complicated than those who termed the American, ‘the real Prime Minister of Pakistan.’. Hildreth like any diplomat sought to nudge Pakistan’s policy in the direction his home nation desired, but he was certainly not pulling the strings. Moreover, whilst Hildreth relayed Mirza’s desire for order in a chaotic political situation to American policy makers, this reading of Pakistan’s future was far from unanimously accepted in Washington. Pakistan’s first coup was undoubtedly a home-grown affair.

1. Sarah Ansari, *Life after Partition: Migration, Community and Strife in Sindh 1947-62* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2005); Yunas Samad, *A Nation in Turmoil: Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan, 1937-1958* (New Delhi: Sage, 1995); Ayesha Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan’s Political Economy of Defence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 199). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. See, I. Talbot, *Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement: The Growth of the Muslim League in North-West and North-East India, 1937-1947* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Bhutto to Hildreth 6 April 1957, Horace Hildreth Papers Coll 1601, 33/2, Maine Historical Society, Portland. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Hildreth to Bhutto 10 April 1957, Horace Hildreth Papers Coll 1601, 33/2, Maine Historical Society, Portland. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Wolpert argues that Mirza and Sir Shah Nawaz were old friends ‘thanks initially to Mirza’s engineer uncle who had worked for the government of Bombay when Sir Shah Nawaz was minister there.’ This enabled ‘Zulfi (to have) a close family friend in power.’ Stanley Wolpert, *Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life and Times* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p.49. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. See, Hamza Alavi, ‘Pakistan-US Military Alliance, *Economic and Political weekly*, 33, 25 (June 20-26 1998), pp. 1551-7. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. For the flavour of this correspondence see, Charles Hildreth to Horace Hildreth, 25 May 1955, Horace Hildreth Papers Coll 1601, 33/4, Maine Historical Society, Portland. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Horace Hildreth to Dr Milton Eisenhower 28 May 1954, Horace Hildreth Papers Coll 1601, 33/24, Maine Historical Society, Portland. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. See, Philip Crowe to John Emerson 21 October 1954, Horace Hildreth Papers Coll 1601, 33/24, Maine Historical Society, Portland. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Samad, *A Nation in Turmoil*, p.169. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Harshan Kumarasingham, ‘A Transnational Actor on a Dramatic Stage- Sir Ivor Jennings and the Manipulation of Westminster Style Democracy in Pakistan’, *UC Irvine Journal of International, Transnational and Comparative Law,* 2 (Spring, 2017), pp. 33-56. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Ayesha Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan’s Political Economy of Defence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Wolpert, *Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan*, p.48. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. On Bhutto’s hostility to One Unit see, *Ibid* [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Sarah Ansari, *Life After Partition: Migration, Community and Strife in Sindh* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2005), p.98 [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Nusrat was also Zulfiqar’s second wife. She came from a wealthy Kurdish Iranian family. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Horace Hildreth to Samuel Nakasian 17 December 1954, Horace Hildreth Papers Coll 1601, 33/2, Maine Historical Society, Portland. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. *Ibid.* [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Hildreth to Bhutto 17 January 1955, Horace Hildreth Papers Coll 1601, 33/2, Maine Historical Society, Portland. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Bhutto to Hildreth 9 February 1955, Horace Hildreth Papers Coll 1601, 33/2, Maine Historical Society, Portland. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Bhutto to Hildreth 7 March 1956, Horace Hildreth Papers Coll 1601, 33/2, Maine Historical Society, Portland. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Piloo Mody, *Zulfi, My Friend* (Delhi: Thomson Press, 1973), p. 61. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Allan McGrath, *The Destruction of Pakistan’s Democracy* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001). [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. I.A. Rehman, ‘Damned by History’, *Herald* (May 1996), p. 129. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. See, A. McGrath, *The Destruction of Pakistan’s Democracy* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996). [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. M.M. Syed, ‘Pakistan: Struggle for Power 1947-58’, Pakistan Journal of History and Culture XV, 2 (July-December 1994), pp. 85 & ff. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Pir Ali Muhammad Rashdi, *Sindh Ways and Days: Shikar and Other Memories* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 51. Rashdi was a relative of the Pir Pagaro and a close associate of Khuhro. He was an advocate of the One Unit scheme. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. *Ibid*., p.18. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Wolpert, *Zulfi Bhutto*, p.49. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Rashdi, *Sindh Ways and Days* p.47. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Horace Hildreth to Charles Hildreth, 25 January 1955, Horace Hildreth Papers Coll 1601, 33/4, Maine Historical Society, Portland. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Horace Hildreth to Charles Hildreth 25 June 1955, Horace Hildreth Papers Coll 1601, 33/4, Maine Historical Society, Portland. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Hildreth to Bhutto 19 January 1956, Horace Hildreth Papers Coll 1601, 33/2; Hildreth to Family, 7 February 1957, Horace Hildreth Papers Coll 1601, 33/7, Maine Historical Society, Portland. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Hildreth to Bhutto, 4 May 1955, Horace Hildreth Papers Coll 1601, 33/2, Maine Historical Society, Portland. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Bhutto to Hildreth, 3 May 1956, Horace Hildreth Papers Coll 1601, 33/2, Maine Historical society, Portland. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Hildreth to Bhutto 4 May 1955, Horace Hildreth Papers Coll 1601. 33/2, Maine Historical Society, Portland. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Hildreth to Bhutto 17 January 1957, Horace Hildreth Papers Coll 1601, 33/2, Maine Historical Society, Portland. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Hildreth to Bhutto 19 January 1956, Horace Hildreth Papers Coll 1601, 33/2, Maine Historical Society, Portland. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Hildreth to Family 2 February 1956, Horace Hildreth Papers Coll 1601, 33/7, Maine Historical Society, Portland. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Horace Hildreth to Family 14 January 1957, Horace Hildreth Papers Coll 1601, 33/7, Maine Historical Society, Portland. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. On this point see, Sarah Ansari, *Sufi Saints and State Power: The Pirs of Sind, 1843-1957* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 152. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Horace Hildreth to Charles Hildreth, 30 July 1954, Horace Hildreth Papers Coll 1601, 33/4, Maine Historical Society, Portland. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. Ansari, *Life After Partition*, p.112. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. Horace Hildreth to Charles Hildreth, 27 November 1954, Horace Hildreth Papers Coll 1601, 33/4, Maine Historical Society, Portland. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Horace Hildreth to Charles Hildreth 31 May 1955, Horace Hildreth Papers Coll 1601, 33/4, Maine Historical Society, Portland. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Note from Symon 11 December 1957 DO 35/8935, National Archives, Kew. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. Samad, *A Nation in Turmoil*, p.198. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. F.R. Barratt to H.S.H. Stanley 15 August 1958 DO 35/8935 National Archives, Kew. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. Sir Henry Linton to Sir Alexander Symon 2 September 1958 DO 35/8935, National Archives, Kew. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. McMahon, *Cold War on the Periphery*, p.225. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Talbot, *Pakistan: A New History,* p.81. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. Roby C. Barrett, *The Greater Middle East and the Cold War: US Foreign Policy Under Eisenhower and Kennedy* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), p. 103. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. M. Aslam Qureshi, *Anglo-Pakistan Relations 1947-1976* (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, University of Punjab, 1976), p. 238. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)